Abstract. Theory-testing can only inform scientific inquiry when the prediction of test outcome is based upon the current theory (theory-prediction consistency). This investigation explores children's theory-prediction consistency in a computer-mediated task in which multiple opportunities were provided to predict outcomes and review theories. An initial correlation study revealed that theory-prediction consistency was associated with children's success when attempting to identify causation. The second study investigated the effect of goal and a simple intervention upon children's theory-prediction consistency. The type of goal appeared to have no effect but the intervention, which encouraged the children to use their theory to make predictions, significantly improved their ability to identify cause. Interestingly, it also improved other aspects of their performance -such as encouraging more reflection upon the outcomes of tests. The results imply that poor theory-prediction consistency may be related to difficulties in identifying the type of problem being presented.
Introduction
Previous investigations of children's scientific problem solving have revealed both the importance of effective coordination of theories and evidence, and the development of the investigative skills needed to test the validity of a theory. This latter area of theory testing may involve the design of experiments comparing pre-determined conditions, or the interpretation of data sets arising from more quasi-experimental scenarios in which the dependent variables are not directly controllable. In either case, however, the theoretical significance of the test outcome depends upon a conscious application of the theory when predicting it. Having explicitly theorised about a particular cause, the production of a prediction that appears consistent with that theory tends to indicate both an ability to apply the theory and an awareness that such application is useful to the overall problem-solving process. We have coined the phrase 'theory-prediction consistency' to describe this observable quality of problem-solvers' behaviour. There are reasons why we may hold and espouse a theory without necessarily using it make predictions. Firstly, everyday experience informs us that there are indeed limitations to how useful theories are in making predictions (e.g. We got wet on Saturday because it was raining -will we get wet next Saturday?). We may also espouse theories for social purposes, such as post-hoc justification, that are very different from those associated with prediction making. Within the particular situation of scientific inquiry, however, not basing predictions upon the current theory can be very counter-productive in terms of testing a theory and, therefore, determining causality. The assumed importance of theoryprediction consistency is part of the particular epistemology of science but clearly may not be considered as self-evidently advantageous in all situations. Identifying a problem as being amenable to scientific inquiry may, therefore, be an important precursor to applying scientific epistemological principles that include theory-prediction consistency. Both identification of the problem type and recognition of the need for theory-prediction consistency may be prompted by unsuccessful attempts to use other types of strategy (We have chosen the term 'theory-prediction consistency' rather than 'appropriate prediction' because this latter term may be confused with merely the correct prediction).
Ensuring that a prediction is based upon a current theory has largely been ignored as a source of difficulty for children, with the implicit assumption that children generally understand the need for theory-prediction consistency when solving a problem scientifically. For example, Klahr (2000) investigated the ability of children to discover the function of a mystery computer key when programming the movement of a toy vehicle. Through analysing the children's theories about the key's function and the experiments the children designed to test these theories, Klahr proposed a model of scientific thinking involving a search in multiple, interacting, problem spaces. Klahr (2000) compared the prediction he made from their theory, with the subsequent experiment they designed, thus making the assumption that the children themselves would have made such a prediction. At first sight, such an assumption might appear reasonable. Indeed, if a child has designed an appropriate experiment to test their theory, one can probably assume that they have used their theory to
